审查
审计
会计
贷款
业务
金融体系
财务
政治学
法学
作者
Matthew Ege,Allison Nicoletti,Sarah B. Stuber
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2023-0690
摘要
ABSTRACT We examine whether auditor scrutiny over the allowance for loan losses (ALL) is associated with bank lending decisions. Using PCAOB inspection findings over the ALL to capture increases in auditor scrutiny, we find that auditor scrutiny is associated with a larger ALL for homogeneous loans (i.e., residential mortgages and consumer loans) but not for heterogeneous loans (i.e., commercial real estate; commercial and industrial loans). We next find that auditor scrutiny is associated with a shift in lending away from homogeneous loans, consistent with auditor scrutiny reducing the relative attractiveness of homogeneous loans. These findings suggest that policymakers and audit regulators can indirectly affect bank lending by exercising their authority in ways that affect auditor scrutiny. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources discussed in the paper. JEL Classifications: G21; M42; M48.
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