斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
业务
利润(经济学)
对偶(语法数字)
频道(广播)
数据收集
产业组织
定价策略
商业
微观经济学
营销
经济
计算机科学
电信
艺术
文学类
统计
数学
作者
Brojeswar Pal,Hemanta Mukherjee,Kripasindhu Chaudhuri
标识
DOI:10.1080/23302674.2024.2391404
摘要
This paper inquires about a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain of green products containing three members. The manufacturer sells products online and in retail channels, whereas he offers retailers a discount on wholesale prices in the retail channel. In reverse flow, the recycler and retailer collect used products through the online and retail channels, respectively. The recycler offers extra collection efforts. After collection, the recycler recycles them as raw material components and sells them to the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces new products using recycled and new raw materials. The crux of this study lies in finding optimal decisions on retail prices, greening level and collection effort level under centralised and decentralised scenarios. The results are illustrated with numerical examples, highlighting the importance of these decisions in the supply chain. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is accomplished to ascertain relevance. The paper's managerial implications indicate that manufacturer profit is highest in all scenarios. The vertical Nash scenario suits the retailer, and the Stackelberg game is appropriate for the manufacturer. Collection efforts help the recycler consistently gather more used products than retailers, and higher collection ensures higher profits. Again, discounts on wholesale prices, up to a specific threshold, benefit channel members except the manufacturer.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI