激励相容性
激励
利润(经济学)
微观经济学
业务
福利
向后兼容性
经济
产业组织
相容性(地球化学)
计算机科学
工程类
操作系统
市场经济
化学工程
作者
Ron Adner,Jianqing Chen,Feng Zhu
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2019-10-22
卷期号:66 (6): 2432-2451
被引量:103
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3327
摘要
We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.
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