皇帝
资本主义
中国
业务
政治学
经济
经济
古代史
历史
法学
政治
作者
Ruowen Xu,Yuval Millo,Crawford Spence
标识
DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12925
摘要
Abstract Previous research on calculative intermediaries shows how these effectively challenge, distort, and disrupt accounting practices in ways that policy‐makers might not anticipate. The promises of surveillance capitalism—with its attendant data architectures, datafication processes, and technological sophistication—are different, supposing more accurate ways of reading individuals and greater calculative certainty overall. Yet there is little empirical research to explore how surveillance capitalism manifests itself at the organizational level, either conceptually or operationally. As a result, it remains uncertain whether such specters of omniscience are as haunting in reality as they appear in theory. We explore these themes by way of an ethnographic study into credit scoring in China, showing how intermediary organizations developed a multiplicity of credit scoring models based on machine learning and big data that differed both from original expectations and from each other. These different “renditions” of credit scoring suggest that the data architectures of surveillance capitalism are just as much subject to challenge and adaptation by intermediary organizations as calculative practices, such as accounting, are in more analog environments.
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