业务
国家所有制
公司治理
激励
会计
中国
衡平法
共同所有权
国有
资产收益率
财务
市场经济
证券交易所
经济
新兴市场
法学
政治学
出处
期刊:International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
[Science Publishing Group]
日期:2017-01-01
卷期号:5 (6): 304-304
被引量:2
标识
DOI:10.11648/j.ijefm.20170506.15
摘要
In recent years, managerial ownership has begun to be used as an incentive mechanism in China. Managerial ownership is one of the ways to realize the mixed ownership reform of state owned enterprises. In this paper, the impact of executive stock ownership on corporate performance of China's state-owned listed companies that mixed ownership has been achieved is analyzed. The conclusions are as follows: the state-owned listed companies management ownership and corporate performance has a positive correlation. The financial performance of the company increases with the proportion of management shareholding, ownership concentration and equity balance. There is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the rate of return on net assets, which shows that the independent directors of state-owned enterprises in China have not played its due role in the governance of state-owned enterprises.
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