注意力争夺与平台内竞争 (Battle for Attention and Intra-platform Competition)

Chinese abstract: 在平台经济中,越来越多的商户采取直播方式吸引消费者注意力,从而极大冲击了依赖搜索方式开展业务的传统商户,构成了激烈的平台内竞争。本文借助Salop模型,刻画直播商户与传统商户的注意力与商品价格双重维度的竞争,并分析其对消费者福利、商户利润与社会总福利的影响。为此,本文构建了包含平台、直播商户、搜索商户、主播和异质性消费者的五阶段动态博弈,分析两类商户争夺平台注意力、直播商户旗下主播与搜索商户展开价格竞争出售商品的行为,以及这些竞争行为对各方的福利影响。论文的主要发现是,当直播商户具备流量优势时,其为缓和商品市场竞争压力,将仅启用少量主播以实现利润最大化;观看直播的注意力成本下降会增加均衡总流量,降低流量溢价,而对商品市场无影响;搜索的注意力成本下降则会导致均衡总流量下降并同时降低流量和商品市场溢价。此外,本文还发现在不同市场环境下,平台内竞争的激烈程度和消费者剩余与社会总福利的变动方向存在不同联系,且平台、商户与消费者间面临着较强的利益一致性。这为平台内外治理和激发平台经济长远活力提供了有益思路。English abstract: In the platform economy, an increasing number of merchants are adopting live-streaming methods to attract consumer attention, which has significantly impacted traditional merchants who rely on search methods to conduct business, leading to intense competition within the platform. This paper utilizes the Salop model to characterize the dual-dimension competition between live-streaming merchants and traditional merchants in terms of attention and product pricing, and analyzes its impact on consumer welfare, merchant profits, and social welfare. To this end, the paper constructs a five-stage dynamic game involving the platform, live-streaming merchants, search merchants, anchors, and heterogeneous consumers. It analyzes the behavior of the two types of merchants competing for platform attention, and the price competition between live-streaming anchors and traditional merchants in selling products, as well as the welfare impact of these competitive behaviors on all parties involved. The main findings of the paper are as follows: when live-streaming merchants have a traffic advantage, they will activate only a small number of anchors to alleviate market competition pressure and maximize profits; a decrease in the attention cost of watching live-streamings will increase the equilibrium total traffic and reduce traffic premiums without affecting the product market; conversely, a decrease in the attention cost of searching will lead to a decline in the equilibrium total traffic and simultaneously lower both traffic and product market premiums. Additionally, the paper finds that in different market environments, the intensity of competition within the platform and the direction of change in consumer surplus and social welfare are differently correlated, and there is a strong consistency of interests among the platform, merchants, and consumers. This provides valuable insights for the governance of the platform and the stimulation of the long-term vitality of the platform economy.