标杆管理
盈利能力指数
补偿(心理学)
高管薪酬
业务
衡平法
水准点(测量)
同级组
支付权益
会计
公司治理
营销
财务
经济
劳动经济学
心理学
政治学
发展心理学
大地测量学
精神分析
法学
地理
作者
Melissa B. Frye,Vladimir A. Gatchev,Duong T. Pham
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102560
摘要
We find that director pay, especially the equity-based portion, is positively related to peer firms' director pay, suggesting boards benchmark when establishing their own compensation. Such benchmarking is distinct from peer benchmarking in CEO pay. We also find a significant bias in peer selection towards peers with relatively high director pay, which helps increase board pay. Peer benchmarking of director compensation is more (less) pronounced in firms with low (high) involvement by institutional investors and firms with declining (increasing) profitability. Overall, our results are consistent with directors engaging in self-dealing when selecting compensation peers, without clear benefits to the firm.
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