Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of fishermen participating in cooperative management under government supervision

The construction of fishermen's organizations is an important way to extend and consolidate the fishery industry chain and speed up the modernization of fisheries. The Chinese government encourages the establishment of new fishery business entities in the form of fishermen's professional cooperatives. However, in the implementation of the policy, the coexistence of demonstration cooperatives and “empty shell” cooperatives is common. To explore the factors that affect the participation of fisheries in cooperative management under government supervision, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game (TEG) model among fishermen, cooperatives and government departments, this paper analyzes the evolutionary stability of the three-party strategy selection of the game, discusses the influencing factors and their relationships to the three-party strategy selection, analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the game system, and uses MATLAB 2017A to conduct simulation analysis. The results show that first, increasing the income of cooperative operations, reducing the cost of close cooperation and increasing the amount of regulatory penalties contribute to the close cooperation of cooperatives. Second, the profitability of cooperatives and the reduction of fishermen's cooperation costs are key factors in promoting cooperation. Third, the interaction of the two key factors of cooperative profits and fishermen's cooperation costs will affect the strategic choices of the three parties in the game. Fourth, support funds have a two-way impact on the choice of three-party strategies. Finally, this study provides policy suggestions for the government to encourage fishermen to participate in cooperatives.