解雇
失业
激励
劳动经济学
非正规部门
业务
经济
经济增长
市场经济
作者
Bernardus Van Doornik,David Schoenherr,Janis Skrastins
出处
期刊:American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
[American Economic Association]
日期:2022-12-30
卷期号:15 (1): 292-318
被引量:7
摘要
Exploiting an unemployment insurance reform in Brazil, we study incentive effects of UI in the presence of informal labor markets. We find that eligibility for UI benefits increases formal layoffs by 11 percent. Most of the additional layoffs are related to workers transitioning to informal employment. We further document formal layoff and recall patterns consistent with rent extraction from the UI system. Workers are laid off as they become eligible for UI benefits and recalled when benefits cease. These patterns are stronger for industries and municipalities with a high degree of labor market informality. (JEL J22, J46, J63, J65, K31, O15)
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