Consequences of Legal Ivory Trade

The Policy Forum by S. Wasser et al. (“Elephants, ivory, and trade,” 12 March, p. [1331][1]) overlooks several points that bear on the issue of whether the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) should allow legal ivory sales. There is no proof that the elephant population is dropping. The two citations given offer no clear evidence. The IUCN Red List categorizes Loxodonta africana as “vulnerable,” below two levels of higher threat, and its population trend is described as “increasing” ([ 1 ][2]). We agree with the statement that “most of Africa lacks adequate controls for protection of elephants,” but rather than target legal ivory sales, CITES should take steps to increase anti-poaching and trade enforcement. Legal ivory sales have not been shown to stimulate poaching ([ 2 ][3]–[ 4 ][4]), despite widespread media claims that link the two. Focus on this issue takes attention away from other factors that drive illegal killings, such as unregulated domestic markets, ivory demand, corruption, and human-elephant conflict. Wasser et al. state that “[i]n the absence of data, precautionary principles should be applied.” Yet precautionary principles can be manipulated to suit one's purposes. The authors assume that a legal trade might lead to irreversible elephant losses. What if the assumption were the opposite—that not allowing trade would lead to increased poaching? This scenario is hardly far-fetched. In the absence of legal supply, ivory demand will inevitably be met by killing elephants illegally. The authors state, accurately, that “one-off” sales introduce uncertainty into the marketplace, but they do not acknowledge that there is another way to reduce uncertainty other than having no sales: Allow a regular, annually recurrent sale to settle the markets, reduce prices, and lower motivation to poach and buy illegal ivory. We believe that both no sales and “one-off ” sales are harmful for elephant conservation and, given sufficient institutional support and political will, a normalized legal ivory trade would save elephant lives. 1. [↵][5] The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, Loxodonta africana ([www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/12392/0][6]). 2. [↵][7] 1. D. Stiles , Environ. Conserv. 34, 309 (2004). [OpenUrl][8] 3. 1. E. Bulte, 2. R. Damania, 3. G. van Kooten , J. Wildlife Manage. 71, 613 (2007). [OpenUrl][9][CrossRef][10] 4. [↵][11] 1. T. Milliken, 2. R. W. Burn, 3. L. Sangalakula , The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) and the Illicit Trade in Ivory (CoP15, Doc. 44.1, TRAFFIC, Cambridge, MA, 2009); [www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-44-01A.pdf][12]. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1187811 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #ref-4 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1 in text [6]: http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/12392/0 [7]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2 in text [8]: {openurl}?query=rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [9]: {openurl}?query=rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.2193%252F2005-721%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [10]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=10.2193/2005-721&link_type=DOI [11]: #xref-ref-4-1 View reference 4 in text [12]: http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-44-01A.pdf