机会主义
业务
心理学
组织承诺
社会心理学
经济
市场经济
作者
Fanglan Pang,Qian Yang,Ruifeng Wei
标识
DOI:10.1080/1051712x.2023.2214785
摘要
Purpose Scholars have conducted extensive research on channel control, which includesboth unilateral and bilateral controls. Researchers have mainly focused on the impact of unilateral controls, whereas bilateral controls have been given little attention. As an important classification of channel control, bilateral controls can save the cost of enterprise channel control and are conducive to the long-term development of channel relationships. This paper aims to investigate how bilateral controls impact opportunism. We attempt to answer the following: (1) How do bilateral controls (bilateral incentives, bilateral monitoring, and bilateral enforcement) affect distributors’ opportunism? (2) What is the mechanism by which bilateral controls affect distributors’ opportunism?
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