政府(语言学)
执行
产业组织
博弈论
外商直接投资
生态效率
进化稳定策略
经济
进化博弈论
机制(生物学)
业务
投资(军事)
序贯博弈
微观经济学
公共经济学
经济体制
环境经济学
生态学
哲学
宏观经济学
语言学
认识论
政治
生物
法学
政治学
作者
Shulin Xu,Quing Zhu,Zhen Yang
标识
DOI:10.1007/s11356-022-23756-5
摘要
We investigate the influencing factors of environmental efficiency of strategic emerging industries (SEIs) and cooperative game mechanism design amongst diversified actors by using China's provincial panel data from 2004 to 2019. Firstly, we find that the following factors improve the environmental efficiency of SEIs: rationalisation of the industrial structure, proportion of the tertiary industry, government's ability to intervene in the economy and fairness and integrity of environmental law enforcement. Conversely, factors, such as intensity of ecological construction and environmental regulation, hamper the environmental efficiency of SEIs. Secondly, evolutionary game analysis indicates that the behavioural strategies of game decision-making subjects depend on the behavioural decisions of the relative actors, social supervision and government regulation, which work together in influencing the environmental efficiency of SEIs. {innovation, supervision} is the optimal equilibrium state of the game. Thirdly, simulation results show that in the absence of government regulation, foreign direct investment (FDI) slows down the speed of firms tending to the equilibrium state of green innovation. The potential gain and loss of social supervision on corporate behaviour is an important factor affecting government behaviour decision making. Governments prefer punishment tools in environmental regulation, therefore influencing noninnovative firms in SEIs. We contribute to prior works by unifying various policy tools into the same econometric model framework based on an evolutionary game model.
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