成本分摊
供应链
业务
干预(咨询)
博弈论
政府(语言学)
环境经济学
经济干预主义
斯塔克伯格竞赛
经济
营销
微观经济学
心理学
哲学
精神科
法学
政治
语言学
政治学
作者
Meng Shang,Hui Li,Yuping Wang,Yiyan Qin,Yu Liu,Yong Tan
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.seta.2021.101283
摘要
The importance of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) emission reduction management is highlighted, because of the intensifying pressure of warming and natural resource shortages. It explores the influence of different policies of government intervention on the optimal decisions of CLSC. It is considered that the market demand is affected by three kinds of effort (reducing carbon emission effort, recycling effort input and advertising effort). Moreover, four different scenarios are constructed, namely without government intervention scenario, government sharing the manufacturer’s reducing carbon emissions effort cost scenario, government sharing the manufacturer’s recycling effort cost scenario and government sharing the retailer’s advertising effort cost scenario. Their optimal decisions are obtained based on Stackelberg game. The results show that the sharing the retailer’s advertising effort cost is easier for the government to adopt. The enterprise obtains a win–win situation in the government sharing the retailer’s advertising effort cost scenario.
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