公司治理
业务
股权融资
衡平法
工具变量
面板数据
外部融资
媒体报道
会计
财务
金融体系
货币经济学
经济
法学
计量经济学
社会学
债务
媒体研究
政治学
作者
Alberta Di Giuli,Paul A. Laux
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.07.017
摘要
Firms sharing a board member with a media company receive more news coverage. This in turn affects those firms’ financing choices: they issue more bonds, rely less on bank loans, and have lower blockholder ownership. These findings are consistent with media coverage acting as an external governance mechanism that substitutes for monitoring by banks and equity blockholders. The effect of media-linked directors on financing is evident in panel and time series analyses and using two different instrumental variable analyses, suggesting a causal relation.
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