共谋
利润(经济学)
业务
小话
微观经济学
家庭成员
公共关系
经济
产业组织
政治学
医学
家庭医学
作者
Klaus Abbink,Lu Dong,Lingbo Huang
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2021-10-19
卷期号:68 (7): 5187-5200
被引量:8
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4143
摘要
Communication is one of the most effective devices in promoting team cooperation. However, asymmetric communication sometimes breeds collusion and hurts team efficiency. Here, we present experimental evidence showing that excluding one member from team communication hurts team cooperation; the communicating partners collude in profit allocation against the excluded member, and the latter reacts by exerting less effort. Allowing the partners to reach out to the excluded member partially restores cooperation and fairness in profit allocation, but it does not stop the partners from talking behind that member’s back even when they could have talked publicly. The partners sometimes game the system by tricking the excluded member into contributing but then grabbing all profits for themselves. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI