电
电力市场
市电
电力零售
业务
供应链
电价
利润(经济学)
收入
环境经济学
收入分享
投资(军事)
产业组织
服务质量
服务(商务)
微观经济学
经济
财务
营销
工程类
电压
电气工程
政治
法学
政治学
作者
Wei Chen,Haomin Wang,Jingbin He
摘要
An electricity supply chain game model composed of electricity generation enterprise and electricity retailer enterprise is constructed to evaluate the impact of service quality and peak-valley pricing on electricity supply chain coordination mechanism. Decisions on electricity service quality and peak-valley pricing are studied. Following this, the contract coordination under the electricity supply chain is discussed. Based on the game framework, the main research results are as follows. First, the centralized system provides a lower peak-valley price and higher electricity service quality, electricity demand, and supply chain’s profit compared with the decentralized system. Second, with the service quality sensitivity coefficient, the electricity service quality, electricity price, and electricity demand increase, increasing the profit. Third, with the electricity service quality cost coefficient, the electricity service quality, electricity price, and electricity demand decrease, reducing the profit. Fourth, revenue sharing and an electricity service quality investment cost-sharing contract could achieve the coordination of the supply chain.
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