How to incentivize bank credit development in blue carbon projects? A study of refinancing mechanisms with evolutionary game

The improvement of eco-efficiency is strongly supported through blue carbon projects. However, the absence of incentive mechanisms makes risk aversion more alluring to commercial banks than profits, making project funding challenging. In this study, a “refinance for blue” mechanism is developed, and the evolutionary game model integrating the prospect theory (PT) is constructed. We are devoted to elucidating the impact of the perceived utility on player behaviors and confirming the efficacy of this incentive mechanism. Results indicate that: (1) Without any incentive mechanism, blue carbon projects are difficult to develop. (2) By modifying the perceived utility of both maritime enterprises and commercial banks, the “refinance for blue” mechanism helps marine enterprises to escape the financing limitation. (3) Commercial banks are more motivated by refinancing interest rates than by green credit interest rates. Finally, this research provides insightful information for commercial banks with the different perceived utility to assess the financial benefit of financing blue carbon projects and choose the most appropriate option in an unpredictable context.