激励
业务
集合(抽象数据类型)
知识管理
创新管理
过程管理
产业组织
营销
计算机科学
经济
微观经济学
程序设计语言
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-07-14
卷期号:71: 9124-9134
标识
DOI:10.1109/tem.2023.3290893
摘要
Managing innovation requires investments into projects that are fraught with uncertainty. Furthermore, innovation projects typically require collaborative efforts from many stakeholders, all of which must be aligned toward a common goal. The challenges of managing collaborative efforts of multiple stakeholders are compounded by the weak links between those efforts and the subsequent outcomes. In the presence of these challenges, a business culture that tolerates failure is often advocated to better manage the individuals tasked with executing the innovation projects. We develop game-theoretic models to account for the team members' strategic interactions in response to management's tolerance for failure in innovation projects. We find that a tolerance for failure can reduce the incentives required to ensure that stakeholders exert costly efforts toward innovation projects, thereby leading to increased profits and a broader set of conditions where projects may be successfully undertaken. However, as the association between efforts and outcomes becomes more certain, incentives allowing tolerance for failure become more costly, and a strict policy of innovation management should instead be considered.
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