补贴
信息不对称
信息共享
规模不经济
业务
生产(经济)
政府(语言学)
风险厌恶(心理学)
农业
供应链
信息技术
环境经济学
经济
营销
产业组织
公共经济学
微观经济学
期望效用假设
计算机科学
规模经济
数理经济学
哲学
市场经济
万维网
操作系统
生态学
生物
语言学
作者
Xianpei Hong,Ying‐Ju Chen,Yeming Gong,Hua Wang
摘要
Abstract While the previous literature on green technology adoption has not fully considered information sharing, we consider the impact of demand information sharing on the adoption of green technologies by risk‐averse farmers in a vertical agricultural supply chain. We find that government subsidies and information sharing do not always promote farmers' adoption of green technologies. The accuracy of the information plays a vital role in promoting farmers' adoption of green technologies; however, the increased green technology adoption induced by more accurate information may be detrimental to farmer welfare in the presence of production diseconomies. Information sharing can reduce the amount of government subsidies for promoting green technology adoption, thereby suggesting the substitutable role of information and monetary instruments. Nonetheless, information‐sharing may lead to lower water savings and thus should be adopted with caution. Risk aversion has a nontrivial impact on agricultural technology adoption: farmers are more likely to adopt traditional agricultural technologies when their risk aversion is either very low or very high. Finally, we validate our decision model with U.S. Department of Agriculture cotton production data and propose management insights to help farmers make appropriate adoption decisions under information asymmetry and risk‐averse attitudes.
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