重组
债务
债务重组
业务
违约
债券
债券市场
信用衍生工具
信用风险
金融体系
货币经济学
经济
金融经济学
财务
主权债务
法学
主权
政治
政治学
作者
Luca Benzoni,Lorenzo Garlappi,Robert S. Goldstein
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2023-07-01
卷期号:69 (7): 4331-4352
被引量:3
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4529
摘要
We derive a firm’s debt issuance policy when managers have an informational advantage over creditors and face debt restructuring costs. In our model, regardless of how poor their private signal is, managers of firms that can access the credit market avoid default by issuing new debt to service existing debt. Therefore, only bonds of firms that have exhausted their ability to borrow are subject to jump-to-default risk because of incomplete information and, in turn, command a jump-to-default risk premium. We document that our model captures many salient features of the corporate bond market. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4529 .
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