声望
高管薪酬
回归不连续设计
公司治理
补偿(心理学)
会计
稳健性(进化)
排名(信息检索)
业务
样品(材料)
鉴定(生物学)
声誉
营销
经济
心理学
财务
社会心理学
统计
政治学
计算机科学
基因
生物
机器学习
哲学
植物
生物化学
色谱法
语言学
化学
数学
法学
作者
Florens Focke,Ernst Maug,Alexandra Niessen‐Ruenzi
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.011
摘要
We show that chief executive officers (CEOs) of prestigious firms earn less. Total compensation is on average 8% lower for firms listed in Fortune’s ranking of America’s most admired companies. We suggest that CEOs are willing to trade off status and career benefits from working for a publicly admired company against additional monetary compensation. Our identification strategy is based on matched sample analyses, difference-in-differences regressions, and a regression discontinuity design. We perform several robustness checks and exclude many alternative explanations, including that firm prestige just proxies for better corporate governance or for increased exposure of the pay-setting process to media attention.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI