公司治理
业务
控制(管理)
过程(计算)
相关性(法律)
活力
价值(数学)
开放式平台
公共关系
知识管理
营销
计算机科学
经济
管理
政治学
哲学
机器学习
程序设计语言
法学
操作系统
神学
软件
财务
作者
Siobhán O’Mahony,Rebecca Karp
摘要
Abstract Research Summary When platform leaders change the rules guiding who can access and control a platform, the strategies of those who create value from the platform can be upended. Little research examines how platform participants adapt their strategies when a platform leader changes the rules governing access and control. We trace how participation with a development platform evolved under four different governance modes with varied access and control conditions. Participation intensity increased as access opened but decreased when platform leadership became unclear. Distributed platform leadership emerged only once the platform was collectively governed. Rather than assume that all firm participation complements a platform, we show how firms guardedly participate with open and collective platforms in ways that can either extend or subvert a platform's vitality. Managerial Summary As firms consider transitioning proprietary products to more open platforms to grow market share and relevance, we suggest that managers consider the concerns of external participants when designing a system to govern a platform. Opening access to a platform alone may be insufficient to stimulate external participants to contribute and make real commitments. Our research shows that open access did not stimulate external participation when platform leadership was not clear. When a structured but collectively determined development and governance process was created, external participants increased their contributions and even took on project leadership roles—distributing leadership of the platform among many firms.
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