频道(广播)
斯塔克伯格竞赛
业务
代理(哲学)
模式(计算机接口)
佣金
在线和离线
功率(物理)
产业组织
电信
微观经济学
计算机科学
经济
财务
物理
哲学
操作系统
认识论
量子力学
作者
Xujin Pu,Shiming Zhang,Bowen Ji,Guanghua Han
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jretconser.2021.102479
摘要
Abstract This study explores the manufacturer's marketing and pricing strategies for online channel under different offline channel power structures. Through these strategies, the manufacturer sells products through an offline retailer and an e-tailer. The manufacturer decides the cooperation mode with the e-tailer by the reselling or the agency selling mode and the pricing strategy on the basis of the power structures, i.e., vertical Nash structure (VN), manufacturer Stackelberg structure (MS), and retailer Stackelberg structure (RS). We find the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode when the commission rate is less than the given threshold. As long as the commission rate is more than another threshold, the manufacturer selects the online reselling mode under the VN structure; however, the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode under the other two structures. As well, the offline wholesale price is higher under the MS structure than those under the VN and RS structures. When the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode, the offline retail price is highest under the MS structure, and the online retail price is highest under the VN structure. Meanwhile, consumers can always obtain a higher surplus in the online agency selling mode under all offline power structures.
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