激励相容性
相容性(地球化学)
激励
微观经济学
经济
业务
工程类
化学工程
出处
期刊:Econometrica
[Wiley]
日期:1979-01-01
卷期号:47 (1): 61-61
被引量:1994
摘要
Collective choice problems are studied from the Bayesian viewpoint. It is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-compatible mechanisms is compact and convex, and includes the equilibrium allocations for all other mechanisms. The generalized Nash solution proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is then applied to this set to define a bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problems.
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