The uninvited guest: understanding Islamic State’s alliances and rivalries in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region

ABSTRACTTransnational jihadist organizations, such as the Islamic State, have sought to reinforce their reputations by establishing new global affiliates. Islamic State affiliates, in particular, have leveraged preexisting militant infrastructures in new locations to create strategic partnerships with some militant organizations, while delegitimizing and attacking others as rivals. In this context, we pose the following question: what factors explain whether local groups will cooperate with an emergent transnational affiliate, or engage in a rivalry? We present a theoretical framework, which depicts how state sponsorship of militant groups, and the persistent rivalry between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can combine to influence new inter-group relationships. Applying our typology to the case of Islamic State Khorasan in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, we demonstrate that the more adversarial a local militant group’s relationship with the Pakistani state, and the weaker its historical relational proximity to Al-Qaeda, the more likely the group is to cooperate with ISK. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary MaterialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581Notes1 Amira Jadoon with Andrew Mines, The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Rivalries and Alliances (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 2023); Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, “Rising in the East: Regional Overview of the Islamic State’s Operations in Southeast Asia” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2020).2 Institute for Economics & Peace. “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism” (Sydney, Australia, 2019).3 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).4 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).5 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).6 Bond (2010) finds that groups with similar ideologies are seven times likelier to cooperate than those with dissimilar ideologies (pg. 96). 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Greene, Brian J. Phillips, and Samantha Daly, “Competition from Within: Ethnicity, Power, and Militant Group Rivalry,” Defense and Peace Economics 32, no. 6 (2021).21 Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 3 (2020).22 Barak Mendelsohn, “The Battle for Algeria: Explaining Fratricide among Armed Nonstate Actors,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 9 (2021).23 Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 3 (2020).24 Brian Phillips, “Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 1 (2014).25 Paul Wilkinson, “State-Sponsored International Terrorism: The Problems of Response,” The World Today 40, no. 7 (1984).26 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jeremy Berkowitz, “Delegating Terror: Principal–Agent Based Decision Making in State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” International Interactions 44, no. 4 (2018).27 Navin Bapat and Kanisha Bond, “Alliances Between Militant Groups,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (2012).28 Milos Popovic, “Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors,” International Interactions 44, no. 4 (2018).29 Brian Phillips, “Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 11 (2018).30 Belgin San-Akca, States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan, “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” (Santa Monica, CA): RAND Corporation, 2001), xvii; Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60–61.31 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan, “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001), xviii.32 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, David Brannan, “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001), xviii.33 Brian Phillips, “Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 11 (2018).34 Brian Phillips, “Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 11 (2018).35 Tricia Bacon, “Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorism Landscape,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 4 (2014).36 Tricia Bacon, “Hurdles to International Terrorist Alliances: Lessons from Al-Qaeda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 1 (2015).37 Iordanka Alexandrova, “Asymmetric Terrorist Alliances: Strategic Choices of Militant Groups in Southeast Asia” Suvannabhumi: Multidisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asia Studies 11, no. 1 (2019).38 Tricia Bacon, “Hurdles to International Terrorist Alliances: Lessons from Al-Qaeda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 1 (2015).39 Barak Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise: the Expansion of al-Qaeda and its Consequences, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).40 For example, see Jason Warner with Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings, The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).41 Amira Jadoon with Andrew Mines, The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Rivalries and Alliances (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 2023).42 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).43 “Pakistan Mourns 149 Dead in Country’s Second Deadliest Terror Attack,” BBC, July 16, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44847295.44 Mujib Mashal and Fahim Abed, “Terror Attack Strikes Afghan Capital as Another City Is Locked Down for Coronavirus,” New York Times, March 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/world/asia/afghanistan-sikh-kabul.html; Tom O’Connor, “Afghan President Ghani’s Inauguration Ceremony Rocked by Explosions,” Newsweek, March 9, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/afghan-president-rocket-fire-interrupt-1491217.45 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY,2018).46 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).47 Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “Taking Aim: Islamic State Khorasan’s Leadership Losses,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 8 (2019).48 Abdul Basit, “IS Penetration in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017).49 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).50 Stephen Tankel, “Beyond the Double Game: Lessons from Pakistan’s Approach to Islamist Militancy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 4 (2018): 545–575.51 Paul Staniland, Asfandyar Mir, and Sameer Lalwani, “Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier,” Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018).52 This categorization and subsequent explanation is taken from Byman outlined in: Daniel Byman, “The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2008).53 Edward Francis Mickolus, “Combatting International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis,” 1981, pg. 6–3 (Table 6–1); Daniel Byman, “The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2008).54 Paul Staniland, Asfandyar Mir, and Sameer Lalwani, “Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier,” Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018).55 Paul Staniland, Asfandyar Mir, and Sameer Lalwani, “Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier,” Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018).56 Mohammed Hafez, “The Crisis Within Jihadism: The Islamic State’s Puritanism vs. al-Qa`ida’s Populism,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 9 (2020).57 Hassan Abu Hanieh and Mohammad Abu Rumman, “The “Islamic State” Organization: The Sunni Crisis and the Struggle of Global Jihadism” (Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015).58 Mohammed Hafez, “The Crisis Within Jihadism: The Islamic State’s Puritanism vs. al-Qa`ida’s Populism,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 9 (2020).59 Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida Finally Came to West Africa,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 7 (2020).60 Caleb Weiss, “Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. Al-Shabaab,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 4 (2019).61 Sajid Farid Shapoo, “Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: The Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia” (The Soufan Center, New York, 2020).62 Prior to discussing the specifics of our typology, it is important to note that the two independent variables in our study could potentially be inversely correlated in some contexts. That is, where local groups have ties to Al-Qaeda, the host government is less likely to also have close ties with them. While such a relationship is certainly not unlikely in some contexts, in the case of Pakistan, this does not hold true for various reasons. A key reason for the lack of a correlation between our two variables of interest is Pakistan’s tendency to use proxies to maintain strategic influence in the region. As it is has been widely established, Al-Qaeda has always been viewed as a key supporter of the Afghan Taliban, and the latter has been a critical part of the Pakistani state’s strategy to maintain strategic depth on its Western border. As such, links with Al-Qaeda did not necessarily delegitimize a militant organization from the perspective of the Pakistani state. Additionally, Al-Qaeda has also played an indirect role in strengthening Kashmir-based groups (training in Afghanistan camps) which again, further Pakistan’s interests. According to Stephen Tankel, “During the 1990s inAfghanistan, Pakistani Deobandi militants trained at camps in Taliban-controlled areas, their cadres fought alongside the Taliban . … . In addition to solidifying their bonds with the Taliban, this brought them closer to al-Qaeda,” (See Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective” (New America Foundation, Washington, DC, 2010). Moreover, Al-Qaeda was not considered to be a major concern inside Pakistan prior to 9/11, since its focus was largely on the ‘far enemy’ with its bases located in Afghanistan. Finally, Pakistan only started seriously targeting Al-Qaeda operatives once the US put pressure on the government to constrain militancy. Overall, in this specific context, any correlation between the two variables is likely to be weak at best, and unlikely to influence our outcomes.63 See Ely Karmon, Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries,Nationalists and Islamists (Leiden: Brill, 2005).64 Drawing on the work of Ely Karmon, Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations and Assaf Moghadam, Nexus of Global Jihad, we identify three types of cooperation: ideological, logistical, and operational cooperation.65 We did not identify any hostile relationships between Al Qaeda and local groups.66 Daniel Byman and Jennifer R. Williams, “ISIS vs. Al-Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War” (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2015).67 Kanisha Bond, “Power, Identity, Credibility & Cooperation: Examining the Development of Cooperative Arrangements Among Violent Non-State Actors” (PhD Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2010).; Assaf Moghadam, Nexus of Global Jihad: Understanding Cooperation Among Terrorist Actors, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Tricia Bacon, “Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorism Landscape,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 4 (2014).68 Navin Bapat and Kanisha Bond, “Alliances Between Militant Groups,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (2012).69 Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 3 (2020).70 Our initial analysis included 11 groups; however due to the lack of data available on Ansar al-Mujahideen and Ansar ul Khilafat Wal Jihad (also known as Tehrik-e-Khilafat), we excluded these two groups from our analysis.71 See Seawright and Gerring for case selection strategies. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.” 61, no. 2 (2008).72 See Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “Broken, but Not Defeated: An Examination of State-led Operations against Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2015-2018),” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2020).73 We considered but decided against studying a ninth case, Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ). When LeJ splintered from Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), SSP morphed into AWSJ in an attempt to rebrand itself as a political party. ASWJ is not violent in the same way as LeJ and other groups; in 2018, ASWJ had over 100 candidates participate in the Pakistani elections and indeed aligning with ISK would undermine its political objectives. Thus, we decided it best to refrain from analyzing relations with groups identifying as political parties.74 Naumana Kiran and Mohammad Iqbal Chawla, “Counter Sectarian Extremism in Pakistan: A Study of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” FWU Journal of Social Sciences 14, no. 2 (2020).75 Saeed Shah, “Al-Qaeda linked group claims Kabul suicide attacks on Shia pilgrims,” Guardian, December 6, 2011.76 Khuram Iqbal, The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs (London: Lexington Books, 2015).77 “Pakistan Security Report 2017,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies Islamabad, 2018.78 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).79 Hassan Abbas, “Extremism and Terrorism Trends in Pakistan: Changing Dynamics and New Challenges,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 14 (2021).80 Zahid Gishkori, “Balochistan witnesses 70pc surge in violence,” News International, October 26, 2016.81 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).82 Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).83 Aaron Zelin, “Letter from the Taliban To Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi From the Head of the Shura Council,” Lawfare Blog, June 27, 2015, https://www.lawfareblog.com/letter-taliban-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-head-shura-council.84 See Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, “Broken, but Not Defeated: An Examination of State-led Operations against Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2015-2018),” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2020).85 Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, “Challening the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 4 (2018).86 “Nothing to Do with IS: Lashkar,” Greater Kashmir News Network, November 22, 2015.87 Praveen Swami, “Al-Qaeda Sets up Valley Wing with Chandigarh College Dropout as Chief,” Indian Express, July 28, 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/al-qaeda-sets-up-valley-wing-with-chandigarh-college-dropout-as-chief-4770684/.88 Daesh Caused the Most Harm to Islam: JuD,” Daily Regional Times, January 4, 2016.89 Jibran Ahmed and Kay Johnson, “Linked to Taliban and ISIS, Pakistani group seizes notoriety with bomb in park,” Reuters, March 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-blast-militants/linked-to-taliban-and-isis-pakistani-group-seizes-notoriety-with-bomb-in-park-idUKKCN0WU1F4.90 Don Rassler, “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 (2015).91 Amira Jadoon, “Allied & Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2018).92 Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 4 (2021).93 Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 4 (2021).94 Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 4 (2021).95 “IMU Pledges Allegiance to IS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” SITE Intelligence Group, August 6, 2015, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/imu-pledges-allegiance-to-is-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi.html.96 Bill Roggio, “Designations Highlight Taliban’s Longstanding Ties to Al-Qaeda,” (Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington, DC, January 26, 2018).97 Kathy Gannon, “Power Struggle Seen within Surging Islamic State in Afghanistan,” Military Times, June 7, 2017, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/06/07/power-struggle-seen-within-surging-islamic-state-in-afghanistan/. See also Noor Zahid, “Son of Slain IMU Leader Promotes IS in Afghanistan,” Voice of America, February 8, 2017, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/son-of-imu-leader-promotes-is-in-afghanistan/28298506.html; Kathy Gannon, “How Strong is the Islamic State Group in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, April 22, 2018.98 Amira Jadoon, “The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2021).99 Don Rassler, “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3, 2015).100 Elias Groll, “In Battle of Jihadi Groups, Pakistani Taliban Prefers Al-Qaeda Over ISIS,” Foreign Policy, May 28, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/28/in-battle-of-jihadi-groups-pakistani-taliban-prefers-al-qaeda-over-isis/.101 Daud Khattak, “Mangal Bagh and LI Marginalized in Khyber Agency,” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 4 (2012).102 Casey Garret Johnson, “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan,” (United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2016).103 Borhan Osman, “The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How It Began and Where It Stands Now in Nangarhar,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, July, 27, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/104 ISK statement released via Amaq Agency available at https://afghanistan.liveuamap.com/en/2018/5-september-is-released-the-statement-about-clashes-with.105 “Lashkar-e-Islam claims killing 19 Islamic State militants in Nangarhar,” (Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, London, UK, October 7, 2018).106 Khalid Zerai, “ISIS, other militants clash over illegal logging in Nangarhar,” SalaamTimes, April 5, 2018, https://afghanistan.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_st/features/2018/04/05/feature-01.107 Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 3 (2020).108 Zaheerul Hassan, “Quetta Church Attack Planned by Daesh and BNA,” Asian Tribune, December 18, 2017.