补贴
电池(电)
政府(语言学)
业务
功率(物理)
环境经济学
产业组织
经济
语言学
物理
哲学
量子力学
市场经济
作者
Min Xiao,Cong Xu,Fei Xie
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.142989
摘要
From the perspective of promoting the compliant recycling of retired power batteries, this paper considers a power battery recycling supply chain dominated by the electric vehicle battery (EVB) manufacturer, where the formal and informal recyclers compete for recycling. Battery information sharing between the EVB manufacturer and the formal recycler is proposed firstly and based on this, government subsidy for the formal recycler is proposed then. By establishing models and comparing the equilibrium results, the recycling prices, recycling quantities and profit changes of supply chain members under different scenarios are obtained. The study shows that battery information sharing and government subsidy can promote more retired power batteries to enter formal channels and inhibit the development of informal recyclers. In addition, under the battery information sharing model, government subsidy can improve the formal recycler's profit loss due to battery information sharing. The proposal of these measures provides a development direction worthy of reference for the recycling of EVBs and is conducive to building a benign power battery full life cycle system.
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