激励
透视图(图形)
政府(语言学)
惩罚性赔偿
价值(数学)
环境经济学
机制(生物学)
钥匙(锁)
业务
建筑工程
计算机科学
风险分析(工程)
工程类
经济
微观经济学
计算机安全
政治学
人工智能
语言学
哲学
认识论
机器学习
法学
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.enbuild.2024.114653
摘要
Energy-efficiency retrofits (EER) are increasingly becoming a key tool for sustainable building development. Compared to extensive urban renewal, refined building energy retrofits hold more practical value. Of this, the complexities arising from the differences in the claims of multiple stakeholders deserve our attention. However, limited efforts have been made in the existing literature to explore this issue. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for residential EER from the perspective of engineering management. Taking a typical building in an old neighborhood in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province as an example, the theoretical model is validated. The results indicate that participants in the residential EER market display varying decision-making behaviors at different developmental stages. The government's implementation of appropriate punitive measures in the early stages will encourage enterprises to participate in EER. Simultaneously, attention should also be paid to the demands of residents to ensure the smooth progress. Market-based renovation models should be actively promoted, and specific renovation programs should be created to accommodate varying requirements. This paper offers theoretical guidance for decision-making and developing residential EER.
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