Dancing the Foreign Aid Appropriations Dance: Recurring Themes in the Modern Congresses

In studying changes and continuities in the Congress since the early 1960s, a persistent set of “rules of the game’ in the foreign aid appropriations process emerged from the analysis. These rules shape both the foreign aid appropriations process as well as the nature of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches on this issue. Utilizing involved actor accounts and detailed, descriptive case studies of the passage of foreign aid appropriations laws in the early 1960s and 1990s, I argue here that the foreign aid appropriations process is a routinely choreographed political production with important recurring continuities in the modern era. I describe and analyze recurring features of the foreign aid appropriations process that constrain or benefit the various political actors interested in thwarting, advancing, or using the aid program. Furthermore, I argue that from the legislative actors' perspective, the underlying continuities that define the legislative process trump the changes to the process in perceived importance, and that the actors view people, rather than procedure, as the most important determinant of success or failure.