自治
吓阻理论
背景(考古学)
激励
政治学
核战略
军事科学
核武器
政治
确定性
业务
公共关系
法律与经济学
经济
市场经济
法学
认识论
哲学
古生物学
生物
出处
期刊:Oxford University Press eBooks
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2023-02-23
卷期号:: 72-110
标识
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192858184.003.0003
摘要
Abstract How might AI-enabled capabilities weaken or strengthen deterrence? The chapter considers the potential implications of AI and autonomy for nuclear deterrence theory and practice. It argues that AI and autonomy could decrease nuclear stability and increase the tendency for escalation to nuclear use, thereby undermining deterrence. A growing number of great military powers are investing political capital and financial resources to develop the field of AI technology and AI-enhanced “autonomous” weapon systems to derive the maximum potential military benefits—at a tactical, operational, and strategic level—that these systems offer. As a result, the ubiquity of these new classes of advanced capabilities—and the incentives for militaries to adopt them—on the future battlefield is fast becoming a foregone certainty. Given the recent genesis of AI and autonomy in a military context, and the rich body of work that describes these trends, this research is premised on the assumption that AI and autonomy technology will continue to be embraced—at different speeds and for different goals—by global militaries.
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