进化博弈论
普通合伙企业
灵巧的
私营部门
博弈论
公私合营
业务
公共部门
前景理论
院子
经济
微观经济学
公共经济学
营销
工程类
财务
经济增长
土木工程
经济
物理
量子力学
作者
Xiaotong Cheng,Min Cheng,Yaqun Liu
标识
DOI:10.1139/cjce-2023-0437
摘要
In this study, evolutionary game method, prospect theory, and system dynamics (SD) method are combined to analyze the key stakeholders’ behaviors in the public-private partnership project of not-in-my-back-yard facility. First, the interaction behavior of the public sector, the private sector, and the public and their equilibrium state was analyzed based on the evolutionary game method and prospect theory. Then, the SD method was used to simulate and analyze the impact of different variables on the behavior of the three stakeholders. The results show that the greater the perceived cost difference between the active and negative behavior among the three stakeholders, the more likely they are to take negative behavior. The private sector tends to act opportunistically under low-risk loss situations. Dynamic rewards are more likely to incentivize the public to supervise than high rewards. Some recommendations to promote active behavioral interactions and cooperation among stakeholders were presented accordingly.
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