共同价值拍卖
数字商品
收入
背景(考古学)
计算机科学
微观经济学
独特竞价拍卖
业务
拍卖理论
经济
万维网
生物
会计
古生物学
作者
Andrew V. Goldberg,Jason D. Hartline
标识
DOI:10.1007/3-540-44676-1_35
摘要
Competitive auctions encourage consumers to bid their utility values while achieving revenue close to that of fixed pricing with perfect market analysis. These auctions were introduced in [6] in the context of selling an unlimited number of copies of a single item (e.g., rights to watch a movie broadcast). In this paper we study the case of multiple items (e.g., concurrent broadcast of several movies). We show auctions that are competitive for this case. The underlying auction mechanisms are more sophisticated than in the single item case, and require solving an interesting optimization problem. Our results are based on a sampling problem that may have other applications.
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