竞赛(生物学)
业务
提交
服务(商务)
空格(标点符号)
激励
频道(广播)
集合(抽象数据类型)
商业
商店品牌
广告
营销
产业组织
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
电信
数据库
生物
操作系统
程序设计语言
生态学
作者
Kinshuk Jerath,Z. John Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1509/jmkr.47.4.748
摘要
In a store-within-a-store arrangement, retailers essentially rent out retail space to manufacturers and give them complete autonomy over retail decisions, such as pricing and in-store service. This intriguing retailing format appears in an increasing number of large department stores worldwide. The authors use a theoretical model to investigate the economic incentives a retailer faces when deciding on this arrangement. The retailer's trade-off is between channel efficiency and interbrand competition, moderated by returns to in-store service and increased store traffic. The retailer cannot credibly commit to the retail prices and service levels that the manufacturers effect in an integrated channel, so it decides instead to allow them to set up stores within its store. Thus, the stores-within-a-store phenomenon emerges when a powerful retailer, ironically, gives manufacturers autonomy in its retail space. An extension of the model to the case of competing retailers shows that the store-within-a-store arrangement can moderate interstore competition.
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