尊敬
竞争对手分析
业务
产业组织
法律与经济学
认识论
实证经济学
经济
营销
心理学
社会心理学
哲学
作者
Rodolphe Durand,Henning Piezunka,Philipp Reineke
出处
期刊:Organization Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2024-11-20
标识
DOI:10.1287/orsc.2023.17474
摘要
When a contest is decided, the inferior competitor is supposed to defer to the superior opponent. Yet, sometimes the losing actors refuse to give in. We theorize why and when losing actors do not defer—even when they are supposed to. We hypothesize that when the losing actors categorize their relationship with an opponent as rivalrous beyond the current contest and may obtain some contest-specific gains independent of the focal encounter, they will not defer as much as expected. Unique data from Formula One racing prove strong support. Our findings contribute to research on deference as well as on competition and rivalry. Our study also has broader implications as it helps explain when people do not respect social norms while competing—be it for rewards, for promotions, or in elections.
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