Controlling Federal Agencies by Claims on Their Appropriations? The Takings Bill and the Power of the Purse

The Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, which makes Congress arguably the most powerful government entity. This article addresses the constitutional function and importance of the Congress' control of the purse and explains how such power affects Congressional appropriations. It also considers how Congress' ability to control government finances interacts with other Congressional and executive constitutional powers. In so doing, the author contends that Congress, by determining the activities on which public funds are spent, defines the parameters of the federal government.Analyzing how the Principle of the Public Fisc. and the Principle of Appropriations Control interact and limit the executive branch, the author develops a general theory of Congress' appropriations power and examines how that power has been used in the 19th and 20th centuries. Absent the development of institutional mechanisms designed to help Congress abide by constitutional norms, he argues, Congress' complete control of government expenditures is at odds with the checks and balances and separation of powers principles.