Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933
投资银行业务
承销
货币
业务
金融体系
经纪商
国家银行
会计
财务
经济
货币经济学
作者
Randall S. Kroszner,Raghuram G. Rajan
出处
期刊:Oxford University Press eBooks [Oxford University Press] 日期:2004-03-25卷期号:: 374-404被引量:552
标识
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199242948.003.0017
摘要
Abstract The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibits commercial banks from underwriting, holding, or dealing in corporate securities, either directly or through securities affiliates.1 The driving force behind the Act was Senator Carter Glass, who strongly believed that direct commerical-bank involvement with corporate securities was detrimental to the stability of the financial system. The commingling of investment and commercial banking functions, Glass and others argued, creates significant conflicts of interest. This view gained popular support after the Pecora Committee investigations (U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 1933-1934) into the potentially conflictladen and putatively abusive practices at securities affiliates of the two most prominent national banks, National City Company and Chase Securities Company.