物理主义
认识论
工具主义
形而上学
哲学
价值(数学)
意义(存在)
经验主义
心理学
计算机科学
机器学习
标识
DOI:10.53765/20512201.28.9.181
摘要
This essay critically engages with two themes in Philip Goff's book Galileo's Error regarding, first, the limits to what we can learn from physical science and, second, the comparative metaphysical and ethical implications of panpsychism and physicalism. I argue that the instrumentalist and structuralist theses Goff uses to prop up his claims about the limits of physical science are unmotivated and, even if they were motivated, would not support the sort of panpsychism Goff recommends. The second part of the essay shows why physicalism is, contrary to Goff's claims, no worse than panpsychism when it comes to providing accounts of free will, objective value, and meaning.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI