校长(计算机安全)
业务
声誉
贷款
内生性
激励
认证
财务
经济
微观经济学
社会科学
计算机科学
操作系统
社会学
计量经济学
管理
作者
Ling Cen,Sudipto Dasgupta,Redouane Elkamhi,Raunaq S. Pungaliya
出处
期刊:European Finance Review
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2015-05-13
卷期号:20 (2): 501-533
被引量:118
摘要
Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.
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