Financing strategies for a capital‐constrained manufacturer in a dual‐channel supply chain

Abstract This study investigates a co‐opetition‐type dual‐channel supply chain that consists of a competitive supplier (CS) and a capital‐constrained manufacturer (CCM). The CCM procures key components from and simultaneously competes with the CS in the consumer market. To address the CCM's capital constraint, we consider three financing strategies, namely, trade credit, bank loan, and hybrid financing (i.e., combined use of bank loan and equity financing). Game models are established to characterize the interactions between the CS and CCM. The corresponding equilibria are derived under each strategy. Then, comparative analyses are conducted, and the CS's and CCM's preference structures regarding the three strategies are revealed. On this basis, the equilibrium strategy can be concluded as either trade credit or hybrid financing, but never bank loan. Specifically, when the equity financing ratio is small or large, trade credit is an equilibrium strategy. When the equity financing ratio is medium, the equilibrium strategy between trade credit and hybrid financing is determined by consumers’ product preference and loan interest rate.