Managing Multirooming: Why Uniform Price Can Be Optimal for a Monopoly Retailer and Can Be Uniformly Lower

对偶(语法数字) 在线和离线 产品(数学) 定价策略 垄断 价格歧视 微观经济学 业务 搜索成本 动态定价 营销 经济 计算机科学 艺术 几何学 文学类 数学 操作系统
作者
Yuxin Chen,Yue Dai,Zhe Zhang,Kun Zhang
出处
期刊:Management Science [Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
卷期号:70 (5): 3102-3122 被引量:17
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4849
摘要

Retailers managing both online and offline channels have to decide whether to adopt the uniform (i.e., charging the same price online and offline) or dual (i.e., charging different prices online and offline) pricing strategy. This decision is made even more challenging as consumers are increasingly multirooming as they may search offline and then purchase online (showrooming) or the other way around (webrooming). In this paper, we develop an analytical model to examine such a decision. The model takes into consideration (1) consumers’ uncertainty about digital and nondigital product attributes, (2) consumers’ costs of showrooming as well as webrooming, and (3) the prevalence of costly product return. We show that uniform pricing can be optimal for a monopoly retailer even though consumers have different costs for shopping online versus offline and there is no intrinsic disutility against price discrimination by consumers. In addition, when the uniform price is optimal, it can be lower than both the offline and online prices under optimal dual pricing. This is because, compared with dual pricing, uniform pricing eliminates consumers’ uncertainty about the offline store’s price so that they are more likely to search the nondigital attribute at the offline store and buy the fitted product. Moreover, a relatively higher online price has to be used under dual pricing to encourage consumers to search offline for the purpose of reducing the product return costs. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71922008, 71972043, 72025102, and 72091211] and the Sci-Tech Innovation Foundation of School of Management at Fudan University [Grant 20210202]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4849 .
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