Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of three parties of electricity market regulation under government participation mechanism

Promoting the widespread access and integration of new energy generation into existing power markets is a key strategy for China to achieve peak carbon and carbon neutrality. A joint regulatory mechanism composed of government regulators, power generation enterprises, and third-party testing organizations has become an effective way to ensure the stable operation of the power market and safeguard the economic interest of all parties. In order to analyze the key factors affecting the mechanism and improve the regulatory efficiency, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model, explores the motivations of the participants under different strategy choices, and establishes a set of indicator systems for evaluating producers. The evolutionary game model is numerically simulated using the unified dynamics method, and the evolutionary stable strategy analysis is used to reveal how the key parameters affect the outcome of the game and its dynamic process, so as to find out the potential driving factors affecting the strategy choices. The results of the study show that in the early stage of market development, it is crucial to improve the profitability of firms, and the government needs to impose strict penalties and high incentives. As the market gradually matures and becomes more transparent, the government can gradually reduce the level of penalties. At the same time, ensuring accountability mechanisms from higher authorities to the government is key to ensure the effectiveness of regulation. This study provides an important theoretical basis and policy recommendations for constructing a new regulatory structure for the electricity market.