排
撤销
计算机科学
加密
鉴定(生物学)
计算机安全
访问控制
密码学
群签名
计算机网络
方案(数学)
通信源
公钥密码术
控制(管理)
操作系统
架空(工程)
人工智能
数学分析
生物
植物
数学
作者
Yanan Zhao,Haiyang Yu,Yuhao Liang,Alessandro Brighente,Mauro Conti,Jianfei Sun,Yilong Ren
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-01-01
卷期号:: 1-14
标识
DOI:10.1109/tits.2023.3329488
摘要
The secure transmission of instructions among vehicles in a platoon is one of the most essential needs for a vehicle platoon. Despite the existence of cryptographic methods to securely share instructions, instruction sharing is still subject to forgery, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks. Therefore, it is urgent to find a solution to perform data source identification to filter out irrelevant information (not instructions) while ensuring the authenticity of encrypted instructions is urgent to address. In addition, immediate revocation of credentials is also a crucial requirement for a vehicle platoon when an authorized vehicle member misbehaves. In this paper, we propose the first Secure Source Identification Scheme for Revocable Instruction Sharing (SI-RIS) to securely simultaneously achieve bilateral fine-grained access control, data source identification, immediate vehicle user revocation, and efficient encryption in vehicle platoons. Specifically, our SI-RIS solution supports fine-grained access control for both the sender and receiver over the encrypted instructions. As a result, only authorized correspondents are able to access the commands. Furthermore, upon identification of malicious members in the platoon, our SI-RIS provides an efficient direct vehicle user revocation mechanism capable of immediate revocation credentials without affecting other vehicles. We prove the security of our SI-RIS via rigorous mathematical security proof. Moreover, performance evaluation and comparisons illustrate the feasibility and practicability of SI-RIS for vehicle platoon.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI