股权风险
股权溢价之谜
经济
股票资本市场
套利
内幕交易
知情人
货币经济学
金融经济学
衡平法
资本资产定价模型
私募股权
财务
政治学
法学
作者
Yongshen Zhang,Qing Zhang,Xiaoliang Yu,Qiushu Ma
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.102047
摘要
Based on catering theory and M&A arbitrage theory, this paper focuses on the motivation and economic consequences of high premium M&A in China's capital market. The main research conclusions are as follows: First, the more equity overvaluation, the higher the merger premium and the short-term excess market return. Second, the more insider trading behaviour after equity overvaluation, the higher the merger premium and the short-term excess market return. Third, the greater the short-selling pressure after the equity overvaluation, the lower the merger premium and the weaker the short-term excess market return. Finally, this paper studies the economic consequences of M&A after equity overvaluation, and finds that M&A driven by equity overvaluation can only improve M&A performance in the current year, but cannot achieve long-term synergies. Based on the theory of M&A arbitrage, this paper studies the explanation mechanism of equity overvaluation to high-premium M&A in China's capital market, provides new evidence for executive's agency behaviour in M&A. This paper has important policy implications for the healthy development of M&A in the current emerging capital market.
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