保密
透明度(行为)
监督人
感知
社会心理学
心理学
透视图(图形)
公共关系
政治学
计算机科学
经济
计算机安全
管理
人工智能
神经科学
作者
Sophie De Winne,Elise Marescaux,Emma Raets,Nicky Dries
标识
DOI:10.1177/10596011241273430
摘要
This study employs Uncertainty Management Theory (UMT) to explore how co-workers respond to supervisors’ communication about idiosyncratic deals (i-deals), specifically comparing secrecy and transparency. We suggest that co-workers’ perceptions of i-deal secrecy, as opposed to transparency, lead to uncertainty. Moreover, misalignment between co-workers’ perceptions and supervisors’ intentions regarding i-deal communication may create a second source of uncertainty. We propose that co-workers cope with this uncertainty by forming moral judgments about the i-deal communication, which subsequently relate to their trust in their supervisor and their turnover intentions. Data were collected from 27 supervisors and 224 co-workers across 27 teams, resulting in 224 matched co-worker-supervisor responses. Polynomial regressions reveal varying outcomes depending on the (mis)alignment between co-workers’ perceptions and supervisors’ intentions. Co-workers’ moral judgments, trust in their supervisor and turnover intentions are optimal when they perceive i-deal transparency, regardless of the supervisor’s intentions. These factors are suboptimal when co-workers’ perceptions of i-deal secrecy align with supervisors’ intentions, and detrimental when co-workers perceive i-deal secrecy while supervisors intend transparency. Our findings highlight the potential consequences of supervisors’ intentions for i-deal transparency, showing they can be positive or negative depending on co-workers’ perceptions. Moreover, supervisors’ intentions for i-deal secrecy are not necessarily problematic as long as co-workers perceive transparency. Yet, once secrecy intentions are revealed, suboptimal co-worker reactions occur.
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