计算机科学
信息物理系统
控制器(灌溉)
重放攻击
异常检测
观察员(物理)
隐蔽的
卡尔曼滤波器
探测器
实时计算
控制理论(社会学)
控制(管理)
人工智能
计算机网络
生物
电信
密码
操作系统
物理
哲学
量子力学
语言学
农学
作者
Mehran Attar,Walter Lúcia
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2023-12-01
卷期号:10 (4): 1844-1854
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1109/tcns.2023.3244103
摘要
In recent years, different intelligent and undetectable cyber-attacks against networked control systems (e.g., replay and covert attacks) have been investigated. In this paper, we design a novel control architecture that prevents their existence. In particular, first, we propose to encode the sensor outputs into a randomly changing lower-dimensional space obtained by means of principal component analysis. Such a transformation ensures optimal information reconstruction on the controller's side, and it prevents the attacker from accessing the original sensor measurements, nullifying the possibility of perfect stealthy attacks. Then, on the controller's side, we design a passive Gaussian anomaly detector that leverages the output of an unknown input observer ad-hoc designed to estimate the system's states and unknown inputs simultaneously. It is formally shown that the proposed detection strategy is able to discover the presence of replay and covert attacks. Simulation results obtained considering a quadruple water tank system confirm the capability of the developed architecture.
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