Choice of the co-opetition model for a new energy vehicle supply chain under government subsidies

We study the co-opetition model selection problem for a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising a dominant manufacturer and a subordinate supplier. Given the impact of R&D subsidies on suppliers' technological innovation, we consider two co-opetition models, namely wholesale co-opetition and patent licensing co-opetition, derive the optimal decisions of the models, and analyze the optimal selections for supply chain members. We also conduct extensive numerical studies to verify the research findings and generate practical insights. We find that patent licensing co-opetition is not necessarily beneficial to supply chain members. However, under certain conditions, patent licensing co-opetition can create a "win-win" situation for the supply chain. Furthermore, as the degree of product substitution increases under patent licensing co-opetition, the optimal retail prices of the manufacturer and supplier both decrease first and then increase, but their thresholds are different. In addition, the R&D cost coefficient positively affects the fixed cost of patent usage, but it does not affect the unit patent licensing fee. This study provides theoretical guidance for supply chain members to choose the optimal co-opetition models and has important practical significance for promoting the sustainable development of the NEV industry.