股东
激励
执行
业务
机构投资者
会计
公共关系
财务
公司治理
货币经济学
经济
微观经济学
法学
政治学
作者
Jacky Chau,Shu-Fang Lai,Yong Yang
出处
期刊:Social Science Research Network
[Social Science Electronic Publishing]
日期:2020-01-01
被引量:12
摘要
We examine investors’ corporate engagements on an online interactive platform that is curated by regulators to encourage the communication between small investors and publicly listed firms. Investors can query for information and voice their criticisms and suggestions in these online engagements. We find that investors’ engagements on the platform increase when the firm shows signs of underperformance, weaker external monitoring by institutional investors, or weaker managerial incentive alignment with shareholders. More active engagements on the platform are associated with more timely enforcement actions against securities fraud. Overall, our findings suggest that individual investors in aggregate manifest incentives to fill in the void of corporate governance when empowered by a conducive regulatory environment.
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