问责
执法
公共行政
公共关系
组织绩效
业务
政治学
法学
营销
标识
DOI:10.1177/02750740221098344
摘要
Although civilian oversight has been introduced to make the police accountable to citizens and perform better, its effectiveness has not been thoroughly investigated yet. To better understand civilian oversight of the police, this study explores its theoretical basis as an accountability mechanism and suggests how it holds police agencies accountable even without direct disciplinary authority. The data from Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program, and the Fatal Encounters (FE) database are analyzed to estimate the effect of civilian oversight on police organizational performance, using a propensity score matching analysis. Among the dependent variables included in the analysis as performance indicators, civilian oversight turns out to have a significant influence only on police agencies’ clearance rates. The police agencies with civilian oversight have lower clearance rates by 2.71 percentage points on average compared to those without civilian oversight. The implications of civilian oversight's negative impact on police organizational performance are further discussed.
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