公理
加法函数
一般化
数理经济学
夏普里值
数学
价值(数学)
对称(几何)
空(SQL)
可转让效用
博弈论
计算机科学
统计
数学分析
几何学
数据库
作者
Anna Khmelnitskaya,Elena Yanovskaya
标识
DOI:10.1007/s00186-006-0119-8
摘要
We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen's one by the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well.
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