Public participation and outgoing audit of natural resources: Evidence from tripartite evolutionary game in China

Public participation is essential to the success of ecological civilization. Whether public participation can effectively play a role in the outgoing audit of natural resources (OANR) is an important issue that remains to be explored. This paper uses the tripartite evolutionary game to explore the mechanism of the audit subjects, the leading cadres, and the public in the OANR. The research finds that there is a two-way linkage relationship between the audit subjects and the leading cadres. The audit subjects and the leading cadres affect the behavior strategies of the public in the indirect way and direct way, respectively. However, the public lacks the path to directly affect the other two subjects. The tripartite ideal audit model of "the audit subjects conduct due diligence audits, leading cadres perform duties, the public participate" cannot be realized. The external effect of the public's strategic choice is not enough to make the profit or loss of leading cadres change structurally and then change their behaviors. This paper demonstrates the reasons why the public cannot effectively participate in the OANR at the current stage from three aspects, which are the interpretation of the equations for replication dynamics, the particularity of the audit system, and the effectiveness of public participation. Three suggestions are put forward which are encouraging citizens' indirect participation in the OANR, disclosing information about the OANR, and improving citizens' awareness of the OANR. This paper has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote public participation in natural resource auditing.