资源诅咒
经济
问责
公司治理
诅咒
收入
税收
现金转账
自然资源
现金
公共经济学
货币经济学
宏观经济学
财务
生态学
社会学
政治学
人类学
法学
生物
作者
Shantayanan Devarajan,Quy‐Toan Do
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104816
摘要
Why is governance in resource-rich countries so poor? We argue that it is because governments in these countries do not rely on taxation, which is an important instrument for citizens to hold their governments accountable. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that the combination of low taxes and weak governance can be an equilibrium in an economy with sizeable mineral revenues. As income from natural resources ultimately declines, replacing it with tax revenues may require governments to give control of these proceeds to citizens, in the form of cash transfers say, as a credible commitment to accountability, thereby breaking the country out of its resource curse.
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